The principles of international law, incorporated into the national law
under Article 15, Part 4 of the current Constitution of the Russian Federation, devote a
great deal of attention to the prompt consideration of criminal cases. Thus, in accordance
with the norms of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, a suspect is
to be informed of the charges against him “in a timely manner” (Part 2, Article 9 of
the Convention), and the court is to “render a decision immediately as to the legality
of his incarceration” (Pt.4, Art. 9). Everyone has the right to “a trial without
unjustifiable incarceration” (Subparagraph C, Pt. 3, Art. 14).
In 1996, the overall number of criminal cases being considered was
1,189,000 (as opposed to 1,075,000 in 1995). Of these, 274,500 cases (23.1%) were
continuing after the expiration of deadlines by first instance criminal courts; in higher
courts, deadlines for the consideration of cases were violated in 3.7% of all instances. A
similar situation may be seen in civil proceedings, which is administered by all general
jurisdiction courts, usually regional.
In 1996, 3,057,000 civil cases were heard in these courts. The deadline
for adjudicating civil cases was violated in 15.7% of all cases (480,000 cases). In Moscow
in 1996, 30% of the criminal cases were considered in violation of deadlines.
Approximately every third person in custody, when brought before a Moscow court, left
empty-handed; that is, his case remained essentially unheard that day. Most often, the
court simply declared a continuance; sometimes, the defendant was not even brought into
the courtroom.
The impression that there are not enough judges to hear all the cases
being brought before the court is confirmed by statistical data. In 1996, in one
particular court, 9 criminal cases and 22.7 civil cases were heard by one judge, along
with 17.5 cases of administrative transgressions. Meanwhile, more than 8% of all bench
positions remained vacant (instead of the 15,732 judges prescribed by law, there were in
1996 only 14,621). Consequently, the actual caseload was higher. It is understandable
then, why thousands of people remain under arrest while awaiting the squeaking wheels of
the judicial machine to turn in their favor.
The following thoughts are appropriate: if the number of judges is not
increased, then it will be necessary to reduce the amount of labor expended on
adjudicating cases. Such an approach bears its own kind of fruits. In the United States,
where plea-bargaining is a common practice, federal judges hear 600-700 civil and 200-250
criminal cases per year. In Russia, the appeal and review courts operate on what might be
called the “janitorial principle” (“However much snow falls, that’s how much you
shovel away!”). In one working day, a second-echelon court might render 15-25 findings,
while the presidium of a district court might hand down 30-60. It is not difficult to
guess, incidentally, the quality of this “justice”. I am firmly convinced, however,
that even under the current conditions of procedure and personnel, the judicial system
could operate 2 to 3 times faster when hearing cases in first instance criminal courts
simply by eliminating the main reasons for red tape.
Judges, in spite of all their desire to adjudicate criminal cases and
determine the fate of the accused, are compelled to delay their hearing, or otherwise not
allow them to move forward, for the following reasons:
First, a judge’s work is poorly organized. He has no personal
assistants—bailiffs or clerks—and the court has not even enough money to pay its
heating and telephone bills. Sometimes it cannot afford to buy writing paper, and the post
office refuses to accept and deliver summons and subpoenas to witnesses. The drawing up of
the court’s sentences and protocols can be delayed for weeks as a result of the lack of
typewriters, let alone computers.
Second, police officers often ignore orders to escort the accused to
court, especially when it is in a locale different from the investigative detention
centre.
Third, the hearing of criminal cases can be held up by failure of the
witnesses or victims to appear in court. Even if the court manages to contact a witness
living in another area, he usually refuses to make the trip (and there is virtually
nothing to be done in such an instance); or he may ask that money be sent to pay his way,
claiming that he is indigent. The court usually does not have money for such purposes, and
even if it did, it would not send out an advance. If the witness lives in the same town or
village where the court is located and he still doesn’t want to appear, the court will
issue a warrant for his arrest; but the local police precincts have no incentive
whatsoever to carry out these orders. In a typical instance, the court receives a report
in the mail from the officer who went out to the address specified on the warrant, saying
that the witness was nowhere to be found.
Fourth, defense lawyers avoid serving as public defenders in cases
involving indigents. The remuneration paid by the court amounts to “up to one half of
the minimum wage” for one day of nerve-wracking work. Meanwhile, in representing the
interests of a paying client, an attorney can earn several million rubles in the same
period of time. For Moscow lawyers, for example, fees of $100 to $200 USD per hour are not
uncommon.
Finally, we cannot help but note that current judicial policy does not differentiate
among criminal cases: those in which the accused are being incarcerated have no special
privileges, and enjoy no particular priority. There are no less harsh alternative
procedures to criminal proceedings, the wide application of which would allow for the
justice system to concentrate on solving the truly important conflicts between the state
and its citizens.
