In autumn of 1991, Soviet prisons and camps found themselves at the mercy of
massive uprisings of prisoners. In most cases these uprisings were peaceful, but in
certain correctional institutions there was armed resistance.
For the first time in 30 years, prisoners protested out of political
concerns as well as demands to change prison conditions. In a number of regions the
demands of prisoners were greeted with the understanding and even support of prison staff.
As the crisis ebbed, the USSR Internal Ministry and Prosecutor General introduced
significant changes in the Rules of Internal Order of Correctional Institutions, meeting
many demands of prisoners on strike. This undoubtedly reduced social tension in places of
confinement. However, legislation contradicted many of the innovations effected in the
change in the regulations.
Both departments acted unlawfully, though quite evidently with good
intentions.
The riots of 1991 were similar to riots that took place in the GULAG forty years earlier. The riots, in the historians'
opinion, played a role not only in the destruction of GULAG
that had just begun, but also in accelerating democratic transformations in the USSR. To
be sure, the riots of earlier times were put down with tanks, resulting in many deaths
among prisoners.
In June 1992 amendments were added to the corrective labor code that
fortified and encoded the regulations introduced in 1991. The contents and consequences of
the new law are discussed in detail in document #1 of this section (The Implementation of
the Law of June 12, 1992). Absolutely humane innovations, in combination with other
processes going on in the institutions, led to a loss of control in the facilities, making
the work of prison personnel a great deal more difficult. Prison administrations responded
by making greater and greater use of passive, and general restraint measures, often
employing spetsnaz units. These legal and half-legal measures were by and large more
repressive than those banned in 1992.
Though the events of 1962 and 1992 seem divergent at first glance, the
authors of the report find striking parallels.
While reformers moved policy in opposite directions, i.e. reactionary
in 1962 and democratic in 1992, both were seemingly indifferent to the existing social and
cultural reality where their reforms would be played out. The report describes the events
preceding the adoption of the Act of 12 June 1992. The MCPR,
actively involved in the development of the draft law, noted the danger of adopting it
without proper funding, particularly in regard to staffing requirements, and structural
changes in the penitentiary system itself. The Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights
successfully blocked all these proposals before the first hearing on the grounds that some
of the proposals endangered the proposal's passage in the Supreme Soviet, while others
were anti-democratic.
The authors of the report give the leadership of the main prison
department mixed grades on the events of 1991—1992. While attempts at reform that went
outside the domain of the department must be viewed negatively, the active support given
to the Act of 12 June 1992 is surely positive. From the sociological point of view,
estimates controdict one another. While local administrations welcomed the unlawful
transformations of the 1991 autumn, they viewed the leadership's active support of the
legislative changes of 1992 as a betrayal. The negative attitude of penitentiary workers
towards its leadership changed after the legislative initiatives of Internal Ministry of
1993 — the proposals supported the corporate interests of the prison personnel.
Changes undertaken by penitentiary departments in the first few years in general
related to structural changes. We list several of them below:
LTPs (rehabilitation centers for forced treatment of alcoholics and
drug addicts) were eliminated;
Control of subsidiary penitentiary departments (such as the Main
Directorate of Timber Correctional Labor Institutions) were centralized under the
supervision of the Main Directorate of Corrections (GUIN
Internal Ministry);
Conscript soldiers of ITUs
(correctional labor institutions) guarding troops were replaced by regular troops;
Management of military forces on penitentiary territory was
transferred to the GUIN Internal Ministry.
In spite of the seemingly progressive character of these changes, each
of them had adverse consequences both for the penitentiary system and society as a whole.
For example, the first innovation resulted in the increase of crimes committed by
alcoholics and drug addicts, because no new institutions were established to replace the
LTP's. Troops used as guards lost much of their funding when they were transferred to GUIN from better-funded Internal Ministry direct control.
They now experience the same lack of funding as the rest of the penitentiary system.
The penitentiary department was always the last to receive its share
from the Internal Ministry resources. In some regions wardens receive neither their
salaries nor uniforms for several months at a time. Unlike conscripts, contract soldiers
are more likely to leave their posts, as now occurs. Now, when social tension in places of
incarceration is very high, poor security can have disastrous consequences for all of
society, including mass escapes, hostage-taking and riots.
It is pointed out in the report that all these innovations were
motivated by normal departmental purposes: striving for more greater influence, more
staff, etc. This is true even in the case of the liquidation of the LTP's, since GUIN receives funding earmarked for drug and alcohol
treatment all the same. A non-departmental approach might find much safer ways of
implementing the very same structural changes. For example, security could be provided by
local authorities, which are more concerned with the security of the community than
federal forces. Practice shows that local law enforcement bodies are much better financed
than federal bodies.
Legislative Changes in 1991—1992