The authors of the report believe that the problems of regular functioning
and reforming the system are quite different, and therefore must be approached
in different manners. The reform of the judicial system can serve as an example.
Implementation of that process was carried out by a
department of the President's administration, independent of both the Ministry
of Justice and the Supreme Court. The Presidential Council on Judicial Reform,
composed of representatives of state entities and independent experts, provided
the conceptual basis for the reforms. The shortcomings of the Council derived
from the fact that it consisted mostly of law experts; there were no specialists
in sociology, culture, economics or management problems.
Even a good reformer rarely has the qualities necessary for
basic management of the system. A manager must be conservative. This is
especially true in the Russian social context. In this country beautiful ideas
and concepts have failed too often, resulting in the very opposite of
intentions, as reformers were given too much latitude. The rift between the
public and the authorities which we noted above exacerbates this problem.
Resistance from the authorities under reform can actually be a positive factor,
as long as it occurs within the rules of the game. To establish these rules is
one of the tasks of the concept under development.
A socially mobile, open and developing society always runs
the risk of negative social processes feeding off otherwise positive processes.
When a strictly regulated, state-controlled society transforms itself into such
a society, destabilizing factors and extreme situations are inevitable. This
creates the danger of reactionary reform efforts. The task of overcoming such
extreme situations must not be laid at the feet of management departments. The
catastrophic reality of Russian pre-trial detention centers (SIZOs)
provides a model for this thesis
Since 1992 Russian SIZOs have become
institutions of torture. The cells look like suffocation cells: less than a half
of one square meter per a person. Russian officials, including higher-rank ones
of Internal Ministry, readily admit this; to judge from their reports, CE
experts and the UN Special Reporter were simply astounded on issues of torture.
But what way out do they see from this situation?
Departments responsible for the current state of affairs
(primarily the Internal Ministry) have yet to offer concrete steps to solve the
problem, except long-term construction and renovation projects unlikely to bring
about any changes before the end of this century. While this approach is optimal
for preserving the institution, it does nothing to remedy the immediate problem.
Programs adopted by the government, even if funding were
realistically available, would still not lessen overcrowding before the year
2000.
As early as in 1992 it was absolutely evident that
overcrowding in SIZOs was caused by the fact
that the number of persons arrested and kept under guard over the previous four
years exceeded the number of prisoners released from SIZOs.
The problem is not in the lack of space in prisons.
In the first half of 1980s, one and a half times more
arrestees went through the same system with less space than that available in
1990 or 1994. Prisons will be overcrowded regardless of new building under such
conditions.
The difference between the number of incoming and outgoing SIZO
prisoners is caused by a complex of reasons requiring detailed and thorough
analysis. The penitentiary administration can address few of these reasons
itself. To reach the necessary balance we need to take some organizational and
technical measures which cost a great deal less than new prisons. Were not so
much money being thrown away on new prisons, they could be implemented. The
problem is not the lack of resources, but irresponsible spending.
The task of overcoming emergency situations should be given
to one particular agency rather than an assortment of departments. The best
agency for this task would most likely be the same body assigned to the task of
implementing reform. Such an agency must, of course, be properly funded.
The MCPR had already developed several ideas
for reform in 1989—90. Over the course of the intervening years they have been
adapted to reflect gained experience, results of discussions with our colleagues
and conceptual proposals of other experts.
The authors of the report commend highly work done by
researchers at the penitentiary workers' training centers: Dr. Vladimir Fefyolov
and his colleagues (Ryazan Higher Internal Ministry School), Dr. Vladimir Utkin
and his colleagues (Tomsk Internal Ministry School and Tomsk University), and
Dr. Gennady Khokhryakov (former associate of the Internal Ministry Research
Institute). Unfortunately, their work is not reflected in the official Internal
Ministry Concept. Their ideas of reform, of course, are not in line with the
interests of the department.
The Concept stipulates the entities to carry out reform of
the criminal justice system: a department on reform implementation and prompt
response to emergency situations provided with the necessary resources; a
council for the reform of the criminal justice system, and an analytical group
of independent experts. The first task for the council should become the
development of a draft of the reform concept, a federal program of urgent
measures to be taken in the event of emergency situations, a project of federal
standards in the correctional system and a federal program on the development of
regional correctional systems. Drafts of a new criminal code, code of criminal
procedures and criminal executive code should not be discussed until the concept
of the reform of the criminal justice system is developed and adopted.
Further in the report the authors discuss proposals for
response to critical situations.
The authors point out that such a program should be based on
the actual resources of the state and society. One of the main goals of the
program should be reducing the number prisoners, first and foremost in SIZOs,
and then in the whole penitentiary system. It will probably be necessary to
reduce the number of penal institutions, prison staff and some other services
functioning. The current criminal justice system would be a burden for Russian
society even in a more favorable economic situation (and even if it provided
basic security). Now prison workers are very poorly supplied both in terms of
salaries and materials needed to perform their jobs. More rational allocation of
resources is needed.
The program of urgent measures should stipulate changes both
in the penal sphere and in other fields of the criminal justice system, because
it is impossible to achieve positive changes only by improving conditions in
places of confinement.
Another important task of this program is to correct the
present criminal and criminal-executive policy.
A simple increase in funding from federal budget and Western
countries will only aggravate already existing problems if not accompanied by
real reform.
The creation of internal social mechanisms to promote
improvements in the functioning of the criminal justice system and public safety
both within the bounds of available resources is no less important than fighting
crime.
Such mechanisms can emerge only with a decentralization (as
well as demilitarization and demonopolization) of the correctional system, the
formation of local and independent correctional systems, a separate criminal
justice system for juvenile offenders, federal and regional systems of
corrections and a system of institutions for detainees at courts and the
Ministry of Justice.
The establishment of regional correctional systems, in
addition to the federal one, provides new possibilities both for radical reform
and supporting structures, not to mention mechanisms regulating the optimal
level of security to available resources and reducing the excessively large
population of prisoners. It is extremely important that offenders serve their
terms in their own region, and on the tab of local taxpayers.
Regional systems would also allow penitentiaries to at least
partially demilitarize; a network of correctional institutions of a new type
should be established independent of Internal Ministry structures. New variants
will no doubt emerge, as new methods are worked out not only in Moscow, but in
dozens of regions as well. The maintenance and construction of prisons and
solution of other related problems will be under the supervision of regions,
while federal efforts (and money) are directed toward more complex and important
issues. Regional authorities will find it easier to locate reserves and deal
with problems as they arise. This will help to make the process of reforming
more flexible, and reduce the risk of social conflicts and riots in places of
confinement during the transition period.
The reform concept should ensure a gradual move. The right to
establish regional bodies and institutions of corrections should be written into
the Correctional Labor Code of the Russian Federation (the draft of the article
in the Correctional Labor Code is included below). A federal program should be
put in place to encourage the establishment of regional correctional systems and
support their functioning.
The concept of the reform should by all means stipulate
proposals on bringing current legislation in the fields of correction,
conditions for detainees and arrestees into compliance with international
standards. But as long as laws remain mere declarations that actually worsen the
situation on the ground, the authors believe that beginning discussion on that
topic would be both senseless and wrong.
June 1995
The
Roles of Management and Reformer