1.
A great deal of international experience over the past three to four decades now makes
it possible to judge the effectiveness of various state strategies against the
present-day explosion of crime. Since the 1950s, crime has become a global problem for
the majority of developed countries: the crime rate has been growing at a very high speed
(even in comparatively calm Northern European countries the number of crimes has increased
more than 4 times during the last 30 years), and the nature of crime has changed
(prevalence of corruption, organized crime, terrorism and vandalism). The experience of
former communist countries, which form their criminal policy in conditions similar to ours
(growth of crime and lack of resources), also deserves attention.
Considering criminal policy in the context of international experience
helps one to better understand the sources of the current crisis.
2.
Harsher criminal policy seems to be a natural response to crime. But
the experience of European countries reveals that the prevailing tendency during the
recent explosion of crime has been the softening rather than the toughening of criminal
policy. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, the relative length of
custodial sentences has been changing in the opposite direction as the crime rate: in 1950
- 37%; in 1960 - 19%; and in 1991 - 5%; more than 60% of those sentenced to imprisonment
(in 1991 - 63%) were given less than one year.
One of the reasons which may explain such a paradoxical reaction to the
crime explosion is the shortage of financial and professional resources which society can
use to combat crime. It is impossible to enlarge these resources in proportion to the
growth in crime rate. Besides, the extensive development of a costly and cumbersome
system of criminal justice could well result in more devastating societal consequences
than crime itself. If criminal policy during the last three or four decades had remained
unchanged, half of the European working population would have consisted of prisoners, as
well as those registering, investigating, and considering criminal cases and guarding
penitentiaries.
Focusing financial and human resources on deterring the escalation of
"non-traditional" crime (organized crime, drug-related crime) required more
tolerance than "traditional" crime (social, household, accidental). Since
"traditional" crime forms the main bulk of all crime, milder sanctions against
"traditional" criminals allowed the prevention of a dramatic increase in prison
population (during a period of considerable growth of the general number of people brought
to criminal trial), thus avoiding the expenditure of enormous resources on the creation of
new prisons.
In the majority of developed countries around the world, the growth of
the relative number of prisoners during a period of increased crime was insignificant, and
in some cases the prison population remained stable or even shrank (for example, in
Poland, Hungary and Moldova). One of the cheapest ways of stabilizing (or reducing) the
prison population is to decriminalize a number of "traditional" crimes, and to
rely more heavily on alternative punishments and early release.
Other strategies (depenalization, reduction of the relative number of
prison sentences and terms of imprisonment) require additional resources for the
development and functioning of those structures responsible for surveillance over
offenders and the implementation of non-custodial punishments. But these expenditures
(calculated according to the number of those accused or convicted) are from 10 to 20 times
lower than those necessary for creating new prisons, and keeping prisoners in penal
institutions.
3.
From 1991-1996, criminal policy in Russia actually continued to use
the strategies of the Soviet era, which entailed indiscriminate, disproportionate and
severe repression. The relative portion of accused whose arrests were authorized by
procurators was then 36-42% of all the people brought to criminal justice, and 35-40% of
those were then sentenced by the courts to imprisonment.
The scale of unfounded arrests, mostly authorized by the procuracy,
arouses special concern. In 1993, 392,000 people were arrested by procurators. 293,000
(that is 34% less) were sentenced to imprisonment by the courts. One should bear in mind
that 12-15% of people given custodial sentences are arrested right in the court room. Even
if we compare the number of suspects arrested by procurators in the previous year and the
number of those sentenced to imprisonment this year, the number of those arrested will be
10-20% higher (see diagram 6 in the appendices). In 1994, for example, 333,000 people were
given prison sentences, that is 18% less. Unfounded arrests were the main reason for
overcrowding in pre-trial detention centers, where conditions were considered to be
torture.
The focus of criminal repression is also obvious. First of all, it
is aimed at groups of the population which are victims of the state social policy. The
number of those arrested, convicts and prisoners is not growing due to an increase in
"non-traditional", dangerous and recidivist crime.
According to the mass media and certain law enforcement bodies, almost
every day contract murders are committed and various conflicts in criminal and legal
business take place. But the majority of solved murders, with few exceptions, can be
referred to as "traditional" crimes, committed in obvious conditions and
presenting no difficulties for investigation. In 70-80% of such cases, offenders are
caught within 24 hours; the number of people who reported these murders is also rather
large.
The number of prison sentences for less serious crimes has increased,
for example. In 1994, it grew by more than 30% (in spite of the amnesty); for petty crimes
(punishable by imprisonment up to one year) - by almost 20%. A steady growth in the number
of first-time offenders and offenders who committed crimes alone has also been recorded.
As a result of such criminal policy the number of prisoners in Russia
has increased by more than 150% during the last five years, while the rate of registered
crimes has grown by only 20-22%. In 1996 allocations to the criminal justice system
from the federal budget exceeded 8.5 trillion rubles, roughly 2% of budget expenditures
and 0.4% of the GDP. Resources spent on maintaining prisoners, penitentiaries and other
related services, according to our estimates, run at close to 2% of the GDP. Such
expenditures would be impossible even for countries with far more successful economies.
Meanwhile, the allocated resources are insufficient to provide the minimum necessary
living conditions for the survival of 1.5 million prisoners and penitentiary workers, let
alone observing any sort of standards.
A new Criminal Code, stipulating the introduction of non-custodial
sentences and short-term arrests, seems to offer some (very modest) possibilities towards
reducing the prison population. But the MVD and Procuracy are against the actual use of
these types of punishments, stating that new services and investment expenditures on new
prison places require additional funds. Meanwhile, it is obvious that expenditures from
the federal budget for building new prison facilities in colonies and SIZOs are going to be much larger. Besides, the use of new
types of punishments would allow in the next two years the reduction of the number of
prisoners to 300,000-400,000 inmates, and lessen the costs of maintaining the whole prison
population.
European countries use short-term imprisonment widely. In Germany 41%
of offenders receive up to six months in prison, and 22% are given from seven months to
one year of imprisonment. In our country, in 1926 (a period of a record crime rate), 51%
of prisoners were sentenced to terms exceeding one year. According to a selective census
of convicts in 1994, only 2.3% of prisoners have served such terms. This type of
punishment was mainly used as "a warning". Noted criminologists and penologists
are of the opinion that short-term imprisonment is much more effective than long-term
imprisonment in the prevention of criminal recidivism.
4.
During periods of increased criminal activity, it is almost impossible
to avoid increased expenditures on criminal justice. Judging by international experience,
the strategy of intensifying the development of criminal justice bodies is the most
effective approach, in regard to the return of invested money. It stipulates, first of
all, the strengthening of law enforcement and judicial bodies, the improvement of staff
professionalism, better technical supply of these and assisting structures (for example,
expertise service), increase in the relative number of technical personnel in criminal
justice bodies as well as organizational and technical changes for helpers aimed at
enabling law enforcement and judicial bodies to process more cases with the same quality.
To improve the carrying capacity of the criminal justice system some other strategies are
also used, which do not require considerable resources--for example, simplified legal
procedures for less serious and obvious offenses.
Another strategy allowing to the conservation of considerable resources
is limiting the sphere of criminal justice activity. To some extent, it can be achieved by
correcting investigative and judicial practice and providing more possibilities for
closing criminal cases at all the stages of administering justice (for example, due to the
wide use of restitution).
For example, in Sweden, since the early 1970s, less than 50% of
offenders who committed petty thefts (50 Swedish crowns, equal to approximately 7 U.S.
dollars) in shops have been brought to trial. In other cases such thefts have been
reported to the police and registered. In Japan, a very small number of criminal cases
ends with a sentence, and the majority of offenders are transferred under the control or
guardianship of public or para-governmental organizations.
Strategies which stipulate the establishment of new (and enlarging
already existing) institutions and agencies, dealing with a considerable flood of clear
and simple for the investigation criminal cases, constitute a more cardinal direction,
requiring additional expenditures. So called "restorative justice",
"compensation justice", "justice of the involved" and courts of
arbitration are becoming more and more widespread.
All these strategies contribute to the reduction of expenses towards
"traditional" crime, and allow scarce financial and professional state resources
to focus on the more dangerous, "non-traditional" crime.
5.
In Russia, in the conditions of permanently diminishing resources (from
1991 to 1996, the GDP decreased by 40%) expenditures for "fighting crime" were
growing, as far as available information allows us to judge, in absolute (in comparable
prices) and relative figures more quickly than crime rate. All this was taking place
parallel to deep and long decrease in financing social and cultural programs seriously
affecting reasons which cause crime.
We can assert that in the field of criminal policy Russia has chosen an
intensive way of developing structures involved in the initial and final stages of
criminal persecution (militia, preliminary investigation, investigation, punishment
implementation in the form of imprisonment). As it was mentioned above, financing of
courts has reached a critical level, after which a collapse of judicial system begins.
About the consequences of this choice we can judge on the changes which occurred in MVD
bodies (ref. to appendixes).
From 1992 to 1996, when the number of investigators grew at almost
16,000 people (58%), the number of investigators with higher juridical education reduced
at 2,800 (to 45% of the total number), those with working experience over three years - at
1,600 (to 34% of the total). In 1996, 20% of investigators had a working experience of
less than a year. They are not properly supplied with equipment and transport. At present
one "investigation case" (a set of all tools necessary on the scene of crime) is
for 15 investigators. At the same time all other services, providing quality and saving
time of investigation, are also poorly financed.
Law quality work of investigation bodies impedes court procedures and
extremely long terms of investigation result in overcrowding of SIZOs.
Such a "reform" could not but has led to the lack of
professionalism of investigation bodies and other consequences devastating for law order.
The same is taking place in other MVD bodies. An effort to increase
proportionately (to the crime rate) the staff of these services resulted, besides spending
enormous resources, in poor quality of their work and, thus, has lead to the break down of
law order, growth of corruption and related to it organized crime. Crime rate among the
personnel of the criminal justice bodies has reached unprecedented scale (ref. to
appendixes), law enforcement bodies (along with growing prison population) have become
one of the main sources of reproduction and expanding organized and professional crime.
6.
International experience shows that the concentration of financial and
human resources on fighting professional, organized and other dangerous types of crime
implies certain costs. Crime rate is on the way up, the level of registered crimes in the
majority of European countries and the U.S. is 2 to 8 times higher as compared to Russia.
Main indicators, by which we traditionally judge about the work of the criminal justice
bodies, are becoming lower. For example, crime clearance in many Western countries does
not exceed 50% during the last quarter of this century (in the U.S. only 20% of serious
crimes are being solved), latent crime is growing too. But western societies endure these
losses in a more calm way than Russian, they still trust their law enforcement bodies and
courts. To a great extent it is connected with the implementation of the strategy aimed at
restoring law order. Since the 1970s criminal policy of developed countries has switched
its attention from the criminal, as the main object of influence, to the victim of crime.
Considerable resources are spent on the realization of the whole range
of rights stipulated by the international legislation: the right to justice and fair
treatment; the right to restitution or compensation by the state (in cases when an
offender is not able to compensate all the damage), the right to social assistance.
Governmental, public, non-governmental and community organizations render various
financial, medical, psychological and social help to the victim of crime even when he or
she doesn't want for some reasons to apply to police or court.
The process of limiting the sphere of the criminal justice activity in
many countries is accompanied with the establishing agencies which use non-repressive and
non-punishing technologies in solving the crime problem. The main goal of these agencies
is to help the victim of crime and the offender. Implementation of this direction in
criminal policy, above all, returns an active role to the victim and offender in solving
conflict between them, while criminal justice gives the right to settle all the victim's
and offender's problems to functionaries of bureaucratic systems.
7.
Analysis of legislative acts, criminal and judicial statistics and
other sources (ref. to appendixes), where the activity of law enforcement bodies is to
certain extent reflected, allows us to assert that criminal policy in Russia has
completely ignored the victim of crime focusing all its attention and efforts on offender.
In analyzed texts the term "a victim of crime" is almost
never mentioned. An aggrieved (this term encompasses only part of the notion "victim
of crime") is there even more pathetic and insignificant than an accused. The norms
of our legislation referring to the rights of victims are a tiny segment of the complete
range of international norms, referring to victims' rights and abuse of power, they also
contradict corresponding constitutional norms. In the new Criminal Code victim's rights
are limited even more that they were in the old one. For example, the punishment
stipulating the compensation of damage to the victim by the accused was excluded (Art. 21,
para. 8, part 1 of the old Criminal Code).
Books of criminal and judicial statistics provide rather detailed
information about the suspects, the accused and convicts: their number, age and social
ratio, distribution according to types of crimes, etc. They don't give any information
about victims of crimes (the number of appeals received from them or initiated criminal
cases, compensation of damages and the like), though MVD bodies have some of it. There is
not a word about victims and aggrieved in MVD reports addressed to public. This is
especially strange, because this information should have been included at least for the
sake of self advertising and creating a less negative image in the public eyes. All this
allows us to set introduce a working hypothesis which, no doubt, needs verification:
authors of reports and criminal statistics feel subconscious hatred to the aggrieved and
victims of crime.
Only MVD and Procuracy officials show interest to victims of crimes in
their text meant for lobbying additional financing and such expanding of departmental
authority which tends to violate constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens.
Thus, current criminal policy has limited itself by the task of
"fighting crime” and is far outside the sphere of important social interests.
8.
Since the 1970-s strategies of preventing crime have become very
important in criminal policy of European countries. Corresponding structures are being set
in order to realize such strategy. A rather detailed description of this tendency is given
in a book by John Graham and Trevol Bennet recently published in Russian. Here we would
like to note the notion "prevention" encompasses a wide range of technologies,
subjects and objects than it is usually considered in our country. Besides crime
prevention (directed to a potential offender and risk groups) it includes situation
prevention of crime (for example, strategies aimed at prevention certain types of crime)
and prevention of crime involving local communities. The later strategy does not imply, as
it is believed in our country, that population is only a reserve for various voluntary
groups maintaining order which members don't differ much from militia rank and file, they
receive not salary. The later strategy mainly uses social and cultural technologies
designed to create internal mechanisms of deterring crime in local communities and use of
the potential of common law and traditional culture.
An example from the above mentioned book demonstrates better
possibilities the use of preventing strategies provide. As a pattern of efficient fight
with crime by the way of intimidating potential criminals with tough penalties, advocates
of severe criminal punishments mercilessly exploit a new Uzbek tale about a sharp decrease
in car thefts after the terms of punishments for this offense were extended beyond any
reasonable limits. In Germany introduction of wheel security locks on all vehicles (both
new and old) immediate and for a long time decreased the number of car thefts and illegal
entering cars.
As we can see, strategies of crime preventing (in this case,
situational), once consistently realized in addition to other measures, help to reduce the
load on the criminal justice bodies, since police (and divisions of criminal justice
following it) is freed from the necessity to deal with a search of stolen cars which is
not very successful.
9.
In periods of criminal outburst and quickly changing social conditions
criminal policy should be dynamic and have mechanisms of correcting strategies. Here,
there is probably main obstacle in implementing efficient and realistic criminal policy in
Russia. It is difficult to imagine that all American taxpayers would agree to pay for the
criminal policy of Texas and California which have 20% of prison population in America.
Even in small European countries the authority of central government is limited to only
national problems of fighting crime. Social and household crimes are dealt with on the
regional and even municipal level. Thus, population of regions and cities pay for its own
safety and prisons (in the U.S. as little as 10% are kept in the federal penitentiary
system) defining what programs should get the priority.
In our opinion, the establishing inner social mechanisms, which will
contribute to a better functioning of the whole criminal justice system and, in
particular, to achieving that optimal level of public safety (and respectively, the number
of prisoners), which would be equal to actual resources and possibilities the society has,
to solve (when necessary) other problems, not less important than "fighting
crime", should become a strategic direction of the criminal justice reform.
Such mechanisms can emerge when criminal justice system is
decentralized, demilitarized and demonopolized, and local, independent from each other
jurisdiction are established (separate juvenile, regional, municipal and federal criminal
justice systems). This way provides new possibilities both for radical reform and emerging
mechanisms, which stimulate the reform itself and emerging mechanisms of establishing
optimal level of safety and reducing the number of prisoners excessive for Russian
conditions. It is extremely important that regional prisons would house their local
offenders on the money of local taxpayers.
A possibility to demilitarize, at least, partially the penitentiary
system will appear: a network of correctional institutions should be established outside
existing and subjected to the MVD structures. There will be many variants of carrying out
the reform, because not in Moscow alone, but in dozens of regions people will think how to
do this. Maintenance, construction and other problems will be under the authority of
subjects of the Federation, while federal budget resources (much less than in case of one
central system) and efforts of the federal department will be focused on more difficult
and important programs. It will be easier for regional authorities to find resources and
provide more efficient ways to solve their own problems. This will allow to make the very
process of reform more flexible, to minimize possible social conflicts and uprisings in
penitentiary institutions during the transitional period.
