Growth of Prison Population in 1991-1996

At the first sight, prison statistics look more straightforward than criminal statistics.

In fact, GUIN’s official statistics are not easy to comprehend. The official figures that are provided “when the gun is still smoking” can be changed by 5-10% after a while. Information about SIZOs is particularly difficult. In some cases, prisoners that are employed in the operation of SIZOs are included in the statistics, in other cases they are not. The same applies to PFRSIs (cells in colonies used to perform the same functions as SIZOs), the number of which in Russia is 157. Their design capacity is 18.5 thousand persons, at the beginning of 2003 they held 6.5 thousand prisoners.

Table 1. Number of prisoners at GUIN institutions in 1993-2003.

Table 1 contains detailed data on Russia’s prisoners for the last ten years. Comparison with the Soviet period would be improper as the number of prisoners varied not only with judicial practices and criminal policies in a given republic, but also with its saturation with camp-based production facilities. Russia and Kazakhstan were regions that received major inflows of free labor from the other republics of the USSR. By 1993, the number of “alien” inmates in Russia was not so significant.

The figures were true at the beginning of the year for GUIN institutions. It should be noted that official statistics only include prisoners of GUIN of the RF MoJ. These account for 92-94% of Russia’s total prisoners, with the rest kept at IVSs and special detention facilities operated by MVD, specialized schools and specialized vocational schools of the Ministry of Education, specialized mental hospitals (the Ministry of Health), disciplinary battalions (the Ministry of Defense), etc. In calculation of the rated number of prisoners, the population data from Goskomstat (the State Statistics Committee) were used (Rossiysky Statistichesky Yezhegodnik, The Russian Statistical Yearbook). The results of the sensus-2002 may adjust the RNP for the recent years to an extent.

Institutions of GUIN of MVD of the RSFSR contained, on January 1, 1991, 745 thousand persons, of which 163 thousand were in SIZOs. The rated number of prisoners was 502. On January 1, 1993, 772 thousand persons, 200 thousand in SIZO, RNP 520

Why and When the Issue of the Need to Reduce Prison Population Was Raised

The situation in the criminal implementation system (“UIS”) was already critical on the eve of the USSR’s dissolution[1]. In 1990-1991, Russian SIZOs and colonies were swept by a wave of mass strikes, hunger strikes, and even riots caused by the inhuman conditions of imprisonment. The crisis of the UIS came as a result of both the outdated laws and the new economic situation.

In the Soviet period, the number of prisoners had no relation whatsoever with either the criminal situation or the need to provide safety to the population, but was dictated solely by the needs and capacity of the camps’ production base. In the 60s and the 70s of the 20^th century, correctional labor institutions (“ITUs”) underwent an economic reform to orient camp industries toward cooperation with large government-owned industries. This necessitated setting up colonies capable of holding a large number of prisoners (1,500 – 3,000 persons). At that time, most ITUs grew to become huge production systems with industrial service lines, storage facilities, etc. The “production zones” bordered on small living areas with barracks packed with forced laborers.

With the dawn of economic reforms in the USSR, the camp industry began its slide to decay, as it was capable of successful functioning only under the conditions of a plan-based economy and the government’s monopoly. Forced labor cannot be competitive in a market economy, in a society with a fair level of development of production forces. At least we are ignorant of any examples proving otherwise.

The foregoing considerations had been put in the base of a program developed by the Public Center for Criminal Justice Reform (“Center”) in 1991. The Program contained proposals designed to put the regulations in line with international standards, and a list of measures aimed to reduce prison population to 350-400 thousand persons (and to 80 thousand in SIZOs). These figures are not an optimal but the maximum number of prisoners. This number depends on the resources that the government can allocate to maintain the UIS, provided there is readiness to ensure such conditions of imprisonment that would satisfy the requirements of at least Russian laws. These issues are discussed in more detail in the Center’s previous publications.[2] I will only note here that the legislative part of those proposals was largely in tune with recommendations of scientists from the Research Institute of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs, and satisfied the requirements put forth by prisoners during their mass protests in the fall of 1991. The law’s final version[3] retained (and even expanded) almost all of the Center’s recommendations calling for greater lenience of the imprisonment regime. By contrast, almost all proposals were disregarded that aimed to reduce the number of prisoners, restrict the right of the ministry to adopt its own regulations, and introduce effective mechanisms of supervision over the observance of prisoners’ rights.

Between 1993 and 1996, the total number of prisoners grew by about a third, while the population of SIZOs increased by almost 50% (See Table 1, Chart 1). Such a rise in the number of prison population in the conditions of an economic decline further aggravated the situation. The situation was particularly grave at SIZOs. Due to the awful crowds in the cells, the prisoners had to take turns and sleep in two or even three shifts. In order to light a match, you had to come up to a door or a window. In hot days, the temperature in the cells reached 40-50°С, causing prisoners to faint en masse, with occasional deaths from oxygen starvation. One of such cases that received a wide publicity occurred in July 1995. Then, 11 persons died in one day and several dozen prisoners were taken to hospital in a critical condition. Hundreds of prisoners cut their veins open in protest against the unbearable conditions of imprisonment.

UN and CE experts visiting Russia in 1994 described the conditions of imprisonment at institutions of this type as torturous. GUIN and the country’s top political leadership agreed with the experts’ opinion, which had a logical consequence at the ministerial level. In 1995, GUIN developed and the government and the President approved and signed a “Concept for Reorganization of the Criminal Execution System of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia (for the Period until 2005).” “Insufficient funding from the budget” was identified as the main cause of the poor situation.

The Concept envisaged a whole range of expensive projects, including programs to build new and rebuild the existing SIZOs. This Program aimed to increase the capacity of institutions of this type to 180 thousand prisoners by the year 2000. Meanwhile, the number of prisoners kept in SIZOs reached 290 thousand by the end of 1995, with the actual finding of the program over all of these years lingering at 3% of the approved amount^[4].

The Concept contained no reference to the need to reduce the number of prisoners in Russia. However,  MVD’s top officials then in charge of GUIN, as they called for stepping up the fight against crime, spoke about the need to make the punishment more severe, thus instigating further growth of the prison population. Mr. P. Mishenkov, a Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs in charge of GUIN, said in October 1995 that periods of imprisonment for grave offences needed to be revised and increased. “We have plenty of room in the colonies,” said Mr. Mishenkov, although he should have known that as early as the beginning of 1995 colonies had already had 25 thousand excess prisoners over their design capacity. In addition, due to the “insufficient funding by the government”, staff workers of penitentiaries were in a pitiful situation, with their paychecks delayed by 3-4 months and no funds to at least provide them with uniforms. In 1995, there were several cases of suicide among penitentiaries’ staff workers left without means to support their half-starved families.

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